University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 8

Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM

Commentary on Govier
Thomas Fischer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Fischer, Thomas, "Commentary on Govier" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 64.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/64

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on Trudy Govier’s “More on Dichotomization: Flipflops of two mistakes”
THOMAS FISCHER
Department of Philosophy
University of Houston Downtown
One Main Street, Ste. N-1009
Houston, TX 77002
USA
fischert@uhd.edu

1. INTRODUCTION
Trudy Govier’s writings are consistently characterized by clarity, insight, thoroughness,
and often social and moral relevance; her current paper is no exception. I shall focus in
this commentary on two areas: (1) criterial issues concerning the Error of Vacuity; and
(2) the language of continua (or spectra) and degrees as metaphorical or literal in the
context of argument typology. My aim is to provide fruitful points of discussion rather
than strongly supported conclusions. I am grateful for the “Objections Considered”
section in her present paper and shall begin by focusing on Objection Two.
2. THE ERROR OF VACUITY AND CRITERIAL ISSUES
Some key excerpts from Objection Two are as follows:
Pragmatically, then, some dichotomies that are in the strict sense false are useful and defensible as
such. Degrees of Q and not-Q, respects in which X qualifies as Q or does not, and even kinds of Q
and not-Q may not actually matter for the purposes at hand. If this is the case, then a dichotomous
framework will be the most convenient one. (p. 8)

Govier’s response to Objection Two is as follows:
If this really is the case, then the dichotomous framework is defensible in such a context, but we
should not forget that it is an oversimplifying framework that glosses over factors that may turn
out to be significant after all. (p. 8)

The word ‘false’ in Objection Two presumably applies only to the Error of Contrariety,
which is a false dichotomy, due to being nonexhaustive. The Error of Vacuity, being
exhaustive, is a true type of dichotomy. Some, perhaps many, instances of the Error of
Contrariety are false but useful, as indicated in Objection Two. Correspondingly
interesting instances of the Error of Vacuity might provisionally be described as
‘problematic but useful’ rather than as ‘false but useful.’ But what sense of ‘problematic’
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is at work here for so-called ‘useful’ instances of the Error of Vacuity? And what more
can be said regarding the nature of the normative criteria that the Error of Vacuity
violates?
While Govier describes the Error of Contrariety as involving mistakes in
“ordinary language use and meaning, correctly understood” (p. 1), she characterizes
statements featuring the Error of Vacuity as providing “remarkably little content,” as
“quasi-logical, in Perelman’s sense,” as Dewey’s “infinite negative,” and as “spuriously
informative.”
The phrase ‘spuriously informative’ suggests to me that the Error of Vacuity can
be appropriately classified as a violation of conversational norms of reasonableness, in
particular Paul Grice’s First Maxim of Quantity: “Make your contribution as informative
as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).” (Grice 1989, p. 26) In A
Systematic Theory of Argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide “speech act
alternatives” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77) to Grice’s Maxims, including
the first rule of language, “You must not perform any speech acts that are
incomprehensible.” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77). In commenting on this
first rule of language, van Eemeren and Grootendorst state:
Naturally, this [first rule of language] does not mean that a speaker or writer has to be completely
explicit, but that the listeners or readers may not be hindered or even prevented from arriving at a
correct interpretation.” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77, emphasis added).

It seems to me that the Error of Vacuity is usefully classified as a dialogical hindrance
because the classes in not-Q appear to have been addressed in the discourse but have
instead been effectively channelled out of the conversation.
The tug and pull over the proper use of not-Q discussed in Govier’s Objection
Two can be understood as being between the First and the Second Gricean Maxims of
Quantity. Grice’s Second Maxim of Quantity is: “Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required.” (Grice 1989, p. 26, emphasis added) If a speaker believes
that some categories do not pertain in an ongoing rational discussion, then the
complementary class not-Q can be appropriately employed as a device for reducing the
amount of the information being conveyed down to the appropriate level.
In a paper entitled Disjunction and Alternativeness (Simons 2001), philosopher
and linguist Mandy Simons, interpreting Grice to an extent, characterizes a set of
disjuncts in a proposition as a kind of list such that the speaker is not committed to any
single item on that list, as would be the case with a list in the form of a conjunction. Lists
are very context-sensitive tools; the exhaustiveness of a list is often not key within a
given context and purpose. Govier’s warning regarding the Error of Vacuity remains
nevertheless very important in selected contexts.
Adherence to maxims of reasonable cooperativeness in conversation seems to me
to be crucially involved in social trust as understood by Govier in her book, Social Trust
and Human Communities. (Govier 1997) Low-trust societies feature markedly low levels
of cooperation, at least beyond the circle of one’s family and close friends. Two types of
low-trust societies examined by Govier in this book are (1) “peasant” societies
characterized by scarcity, and (2) societies with totalitarian governments. Philosopher and
linguist Siobhan Chapman in her book, Paul Grice, Philosopher and Linguist, notes that
the indigenous peoples of Madagascar do not follow Grice’s maxims of quantity because
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they view information as scarce and to be hoarded. (Chapman 2004, p. 198) Empirical
studies might well show that the Error of Vacuity is more prevalent in totalitarian
societies than in liberal, industrialized democracies.
Although these dialog-based criteria regarding the Error of Vacuity are helpful in
my view, further criteria involving pragmatic, semantic, epistemic, or dialectical
dimensions may also be needed. According to Siobhan Chapman, Grice himself was
concerned with “categories as the building blocks of knowledge” (Chapman 2004, p. 71)
Govier has argued in her paper “When They Can’t Talk Back” (Govier 1991, p. 183) that
the dialogical model is not an adequate theory for contexts involving noninteractive
audiences. These important issues, and other related issues, cannot be explored here.
3. CONTINUA, SPECTRA, DEGREES, AND RANKINGS
Govier writes,
But the continuum metaphor itself is a simplifying metaphor. Sometimes the models of continuum
and spectrum are inapplicable. Interestingly, one such instance appears to be that of argument
typology.” (p. 5)

She asks, “of what are these degrees [of argument strength] on the continuum or the
spectrum? There seems to be no good answer to this question.” (p. 5) My aim in this
second commentary section is to explicate three senses in which we talk of continua (or
spectra) and degrees: (1) a literal sense; (2) a semi-metaphorical sense; and (3) a fully
metaphorical sense. I shall then apply these developed distinctions to some issues related
to Govier’s paper.
In a literal continuum, numbers both individuate and rank order the instances
involved. A point in space is both named and individuated by a number, an example
being the halfway points in Zeno’s famous Dichotomy paradox. A common example is
the degrees of temperature, which are both individuated and ranked by numbers. In a
semi-metaphorical use of “continuum,” numbers do not individuate the instances; but the
instances are ranked by posting some of their measured features to a numerical scale. An
example would be measuring the height of 1800 randomly selected people and then
graphing this data, creating most likely a bell-shaped, normal mathematical curve,
suggesting a trichotomous classification.
The fully metaphorical use of “continuum” and “degrees” involves rankings
created without intrinsically using numbers. Consider a stack of 1800 randomly selected,
one-page written arguments that we want to rank according to argument goodness, with
the best at the top of the stack. Initially, two arguments are compared and ranked using
accepted criteria. Then a third argument is compared to each of the first two, the third
argument receiving a rank such that both (1) the argument immediately above it in the
stack is stronger or of the same strength, and (2) the argument immediately below it in the
stack is weaker or of the same strength. This process is repeatable indefinitely until all
arguments are placed in the ordered set of ranked arguments. Applying “continuum” or
“degrees” to the outcome of this ranking would be metaphorical terminology because
there are no numbers directly utilized in the ranking process. After the ranking process is
finished, ordinal numbers may be applied to the instances, i.e. first, second, third, etc.
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Trudy Govier’s paper has shown us how using this fully metaphorical language
can facilitate the imposition of a false continuum on categories and thus on their
instances. In attempting to rank our stack of 1800 written arguments, the outcome would
likely not be a single stack of 1800 arguments but rather various shorter stacks of
arguments labelled “abductive,” “inductive generalization,” “conductive,” etc.
Meaningful comparison of any two arguments in terms of goodness requires significant
relevant similarities of scheme and/or context. The stubborn diversity experienced in the
actual ranking of specific arguments can frustrate theory construction, creating a potential
scenario for imposing a false continuum on diversity.
4. CONCLUSION
In her response to Objection Seven in the present paper, Govier argues that her position is
not post-modernist. She characterizes her position rather as featuring “an insistence on
context and relevant differences.” (p. 7) I fully agree; her role in this paper is that of a
constructive critic cautioning about oversimplification and other mistakes with respect to
categorical schemes and disjunctive propositions.
Her treatment of argument typology in the present paper seems to me to be
congruent with the view that argument sufficiency is inherently comparative, quasiquantitative in the non-numerical sense of ‘more than’ and ‘less than,’ and resistant to
generalization, especially considering the context-centric nature of arguments. It seems to
me that a further congruent view is that argument typology is substantially based on
processes of argument evaluation. If these general points in theory of argument are
accepted, then conductive arguments, which incorporate comparative weighing, may be
in some ways more paradigmatic in argument evaluation than simple arguments.
Link to paper
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